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Introduction
Japan has experienced comprehensive political reforms since the early 1990s. These 
reforms have been conducted in most public domains, including the electoral system, 
public administration and bureaucracy, the prime ministership, the judicial system, 
and intergovernmental relationships. Note that the relationship between the govern-
ment and the private sectors has been also transformed due to reforms in areas such 
as corporate governance and consumer protections. In terms of my argument here, 
these transformations should be regarded as parts of comprehensive institutional re-
forms. The phrase “constitutional reform” might be even more suitable. 
　　Because these political reforms occurred simultaneously with long-lasting eco-
nomic stagnation, they were often considered a major source of the “lost decades” of 
Japan. This view is certainly understandable because political instability can have neg-
ative effects on the economy and society. 1 In this way, it would possible to argue that 
political reforms since the 1990s were worse than meaningless, that is, the reforms de-
stroyed the great harmonies in Japan that were previously enjoyed. For example, 
some believe the political stability that accompanied the predominance of the Liberal 
Democratic Party （LDP） could be recovered by reverting to an electoral system of 
single, nontransferable voting （SNTV） with multimember districts （MMD）. 2
　　Although no one can describe how Japanese politics, economy, and society would 
appear without the political reforms that currently exist, it is worth considering 
whether these reforms were necessary in the context of the early 1990s. The focus 
will be on the intellectual context of the pre-reform era of the 1980s. The author will 
also address how these reasons and contexts affected the contents and effects of politi-
cal reforms. 3
1 　A typical case is the shaky relationship between the government and the Bank of Japan with 
regard to monetary policy.
2 　Interestingly, some scholars note that these reforms, political reforms in particular, have 
made Japanese politics move to the right, although their causal arguments are weak. See, for 
example, Nakano （2015）.
3 　This point is argued in my other article. See Machidori （2015）.
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Two Intellectual Tides in the 1980s
In the 1980s, Japan was enjoying its heyday in many respects. Its economy was seen 
as the most competitive among the developed nations, and it was the only large 
player in Asia. Its society was safe, and it had a large number of young citizens and a 
very low unemployment rate. A consumer-driven culture flourished in urban areas 
such as Tokyo, while rural areas still had large enough work forces to maintain their 
agricultural bases. These elements were products of the stable political conditions be-
ginning in the late 1950s, when the LDP continued to have governing power and coop-
erated with bureaucrats. As is well known, LDP governments focused largely on 
economic development within the context of an alliance between the United States 
and Japan.
　　Intellectuals, however, did not value the LDP predominance, at least until the 
middle of the 1970s for two reasons. First, the LDP was regarded as an old, premod-
ern political party. The LDP members of the Diet （parliament） often came from the 
ruling classes of the prewar era, and they embodied an older type of common sense, 
which often sounded out of date. Because the intellectuals were products of modern 
institutions, such as universities, their negative feelings against the LDP may have 
been the result of divisions between the premodern and the modern in Japanese soci-
ety. In addition, the LDP overrepresented the socioeconomic interests of rural areas. 
After the high economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, approximately half of 
the Japanese population lived in urban and suburban areas around Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Nagoya. However, urban policy was poor, and many urban problems remained un-
solved.
　　This situation began to change in the late 1970s, when some intellectuals shed 
light on the LDP’s positive role in postwar socioeconomic prosperity. 4 Although it is 
possible to give various explanations, I believe there were at least two waves of this 
revaluation.
　　The first wave was that of “Japanese-style pluralism.” As Kōji Nakakita’s excellent 
work shows, some scholars, such as Ken’ichi Kōyama, Shunpei Kumon, and Seizaburō 
Satō, advocated this view （Nakakita 2014）. They pointed out that organizations in 
Japan had unique structures that emphasized long-term, mutual relationships among 
members in general. Although these structures were criticized for being undemo-
4 　While Masataka Kōsaka offered this kind of view on the roles of Shigeru Yoshida for the 
choice of foreign policy in the mid-1960s, it was a persuasive but still not dominant, 
particularly in the intellectual community.
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cratic, they were active, democratic organizations in which every member had the 
right to participate in significant decisions and held veto power. According to the first 
wave of scholars, the LDP also shared these pluralistic organizational features. As a 
result, the LDP could involve various stakeholders in the rapid socioeconomic changes 
of the postwar period.
　　Well-known advocates of Japanese-style pluralism often had personal histories in-
cluding confrontations with Marxism. This would appear to be a significant fact for at 
least two reasons. First, proponents believed that the Japanese style of pluralism was 
a conservative, rather than a liberal, ideology. It was meaningful for them that the 
LDP was not a party of liberal democracy but of conservatism. Second, advocates did 
not sympathize with modernism. In Japanese intellectual history, Marxism was at the 
center of modernism, which emphasizes reason, logic, and theoretical approaches. Tak-
ing anti-Marxist positions, they supported the traditional and irrational aspects of con-
servatism as pluralism.
　　Another often-forgotten wave was that of “liberal modernism.” As mentioned 
above, modernism was largely associated with Marxism among modern Japanese 
intellectuals. However, the realm of modernism is much larger, and it includes many 
types of thoughts. In the case of Japan, it was possible to be supportive of the LDP 
and its policies because the LDP was the only party committed to Western liberal de-
mocracy. Members of the so-called “conservative mainstream （hoshu-honryū）,” such 
as Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Satō, and Kiichi Miyazawa, had a positive attitude towards 
maintaining good relationships with Western democracies, founded on the alliance be-
tween the United States and Japan. They were modernists rather than conservatives. 5
　　The intellectuals of this stream, including Masakazu Yamazaki and Masakata Kō-
saka, took the position that the LDP was reliable because it was committed to achiev-
ing an alliance with Western countries and the fundamental values of modernism. 
These liberal modernists often had American experiences during the formative parts 
of their careers. For example, Yamazaki was at Yale in 1964―65 and Kōsaka was at 
5 　There are many arguments regarding how the “conservative mainstream” and “conservative 
substream （hoshu-bōryū）” should be differentiated. Although it is often noted that foreign 
policy, such as an attitude to U.S.-Japan alliance, was the key （see, for example, Kitaoka 
2008）, the author believes that more fundamental values mattered. The mainstream gave the 
priority to modernism, while the substream prioritized conservatism. The emphasis on the 
significance of the alliance was a concrete expression of the mainstream’s commitment to 
modernism. Support for a U.S.-Japan alliance was possible and logical for conservatives such 
as Nobusuke Kishi and Yasuhiro Nakasone because the national glory of Japan would be 
achieved by the alliance.
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Harvard in 1960―62. These American experiences led them to non-Marxism modernist 
thought. 6
Ideas for Political Reforms
The two intellectual waves described above gave equally positive evaluations of post-
war Japanese politics, in which the LDP was predominant and provided socioeconomic 
stability together with cooperation with bureaucrats. At the same time, however, in-
tellectuals involved in these waves understood that the political and socioeconomic 
fundamentals of Japan had gradually transformed and that Japan must face a new era.
　　As other scholars of this NBK-Harvard project, Andrew Gordon and Shigeki Uno, 
have recently pointed out, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira believed in the necessity 
of transformation, establishing a study group in 1979 （see, for example, Uno 2014）. Al-
though the Ōhira study group （policy research council） included over 100 scholars 
and senior bureaucrats, significant figures from the two intellectual waves, such as 
Kōsaka, Kōyama, Kumon, and Yamazaki, also participated. In other words, the reports 
of the Ōhira study group were co-products of two intellectual waves: Japanese-style 
pluralism and non-Marxist liberal modernism.
　　These two waves, however, separated after Ōhira’s death. When the Ōhira study 
group submitted its final report in the summer of 1980, the Prime Minister had al-
ready died from a sudden heart attack during the general election of 1980. Ōhira’s 
death caused the report to remain in the archives. However, the work of the study 
group returned to political discourse a few years later, when Yasuhiro Nakasone took 
over the prime minister. Since Nakasone continued in this role for five years （1982―
87）, the Nakasone government set the tone for political discourse in the 1980s.
　　Nakasone had a clearly conservative political ideology. He began his political ca-
reer just after the end of World War II, advocating that a “real” independence of the 
Japanese state should be recovered by comprehensive constitutional reform. Because 
he was also a foreign-policy realist, as was Nobusuke Kishi, two-time prime minister 
during the postwar period, Nakasone’s foreign policy largely kept within the tradi-
tional lines the LDP government worked within for years: maintaining the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and remaining committed to the fundamental values of Western liberal de-
mocracy. At the same time, however, he also emphasized the significance of national 
6 　With regard to Kōsaka, it has been often pointed out that his father, philosopher Masaaki 
Kōsaka, had greatly affected. In my view, however, his American experience was as 
significant as his father’s effects. 
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pride, even officially visiting the Yasukuni Shrine publicly as the prime minister. His 
style was a mixture of realism and nationalism, both of which were rooted in conser-
vatism. He was generally accepted by the majority of Japanese voters, who became 
more confident in the postwar development of their country （Hattori 2015）.
　　In this context, it is quite natural and understandable that Nakasone was mainly 
committed to the Japanese style of pluralism from the viewpoint of the LDP predomi-
nance. Koyama, Kumon, and Satō continued to be major advisors of the Nakasone gov-
ernment. Although Nakasone believed the power of the prime minister should be 
strengthened in order to take care of national emergencies, this did not mean that the 
power of the LDP president became stronger. The fundamental features of the deci-
sion-making process remained untouched. Instead, he enacted tough policies against 
leftists both domestically and diplomatically as symbols of the strong prime minister-
ship. 
　　After the Nakasone era, the political and socioeconomic situations began to 
change drastically. As I argued in another article （Machidori 2015）, these changes oc-
curred due to several reasons. 
　　First, the LDP politicians and high-level bureaucrats repeatedly suffered financial 
scandals in the late 1980s. They were clearly side effects of closed decision making 
systems to which advocates of the Japanese style of pluralism preferred. Gathering 
the negative psychological effects of the bubble economy, many voters raised ques-
tions concerning the systems related to LDP predominance. 
　　Second, and more importantly, the end of the Cold War and the experience of the 
Gulf War （1990―91） had a significant effect on Japanese politics. During the Cold War, 
the LDP was the only party positively and clearly committed to the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and the Western world. This allowed Japanese voters and allied governments （e.g., 
the U.S. government） to forgive the LDP some policy miscues and scandals. After the 
end of Cold War, however, these actors began to be dissatisfied with the decision-mak-
ing style of the LDP government, which wasted time and money. Because the Japa-
nese style of pluralism gave veto power to many actors, decisions took a long time to 
make involved extensive expenditures to influence vetoing players. Although this ten-
dency irritated the U.S. government in some negotiations related to economic frictions, 
the Gulf War experience clearly showed it as a significant weak point of the Japanese 
polity.
　　As Japanese-style pluralism was held to be the source of these shortcomings, the 
necessity of a change to a more logical decision-making system that wasted less time 
and money and that had a smaller number of veto players was felt. This meant a 
comeback of liberal modernism. Because the Japanese style of pluralism formed com-
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plex networks of mutual interdependences among major insiders, including LDP mem-
bers of parliament, bureaucrats, interest groups, rural supporters, and local 
governments, reforming the Japanese polity also meant dismantling these mutual 
interdependences and giving excluded outsiders, such as opposition groups, civic orga-
nizations, and urban voters, a chance to participate in decisions.
Call for Political Reforms: Tendency to Majoritarianism
As mentioned in the previous section, political reforms since the 1990s can be under-
stood as a substitute of non-Marxist liberal modernism for Japanese-style pluralism as 
a leading intellectual tide. 7 Although the bearers of liberal modernism changed due to 
the succession of generations among political leaders, the fundamental ideas were 
inherited from intellectuals in the 1970s. 8
　　In a more concrete, institutional context, Japanese-style pluralists positively evalu-
ated the LDP predominance based on SNTV/MMD. Under the SNTV/MMD system, 
between two and six representatives are elected from one electoral district. A candi-
date generally needs only 15 to 20 percent of the total votes to be elected, thereby al-
lowing socioeconomic minorities to be more easily represented and to gain substantial 
veto power in decision-making processes. At the same time, the SNTV/MMD system 
resembles a proportional representation （PR） system because shifts in the electoral 
strength of parties are relatively small over elections. In general, proportional electoral 
systems generate coalition parties. Japan’s system after the war, however, took the 
shape of a permanent two-party coalition government in 1955 when two major parties, 
the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, established a unified party, the LDP, in a 
merger. This practically gave the LDP a one-party government rule; however, there 
were many veto players and plural competition （and stagnation） within the party or-
ganization.
　　The political stability generated by the LDP’s predominance provided a firm bed-
rock for rapid economic growth, but it also produced a number of downsides, including 
7 　The argument in this section is largely based on my other article, in which I conduct a more 
comprehensive analysis of the process and results of Japanese political reforms. See 
Machidori （2015）.
8 　The relationship between the liberal modernism and the conservative mainstream of the 
LDP should not be ignored. Until the 1970s, both were firmly interconnected. In the 1990s, 
however, newly rising intellectuals in liberal modernism were close to LDP members such as 
Ichirō Ozawa, who were not necessarily regarded as members of the conservative 
mainstream. This point should be studied more in detail in future work.
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the entrenchment of relationships between the ruling and opposition parties; the for-
mation of factions within the LDP; a clientelistic and particularistic allocation of bene-
fits; and the diminishment of the opposition party’s ambition to come to power and 
hone its policy-making skills. The particular allocation of benefits based on clientelism 
resulted in the formation of relationships that exchanged political support for the polit-
ical redistribution of goods between the LDP and its member politicians within various 
industries and interest groups. Transaction channels between patrons and clients sta-
bilized due to frequent bureaucratic regulatory involvement. Over time, however, 
these exchanges led to excessively intimate, collusive relationships between politicians, 
bureaucrats, and interest groups. 
　　Although non-Marxist liberal modernists believed LDP predominance had been a 
necessary condition for Japan to have socioeconomic stability and a secure interna-
tional environment based on an alliance with the United States, it was not a foregone 
conclusion that LDP predominance was the only way to achieve these goals. Rather, if 
necessary, changes in power structure could have major positive effects on Japanese 
politics, economy, and society. Relatively, many modernists began to believe that the 
negative effects of LDP predominance exceeded the positive ones after the end of the 
Cold War. 
　　Accordingly, the transformation of these intellectual tides naturally led to a dis-
mantling of LDP predominance along with reforms to the electoral system. Liberal 
modernists argued for a party system that would allow alternations in power. They 
believed parties should compete not internally through factional infighting but against 
each other through proposals for differentiated policy programs. From the viewpoint 
of the electorate, votes could then be cast for parties based on their proposals for na-
tional policy rather than for the qualities of a particular candidate or the kind of ser-
vices the candidate had provided to individual districts or specific industries. Britain’s 
two-party system was considered as a model. As a response to the problems of Japa-
nese politics in the post-war period, the introduction of a single-member district elec-
toral system （SMDs） appeared to be a rational choice that went beyond a simple 
utopian view of British politics or two-party systems.
　　The decision to reform the Lower House’s electoral system to one centered on 
SMDs was made to determine whether Japan would have a two-party or multiparty 
system, interparty competition or intraparty competition, and votes cast based on can-
didate quality or party programs. As comparative political scientist Arend Lijphart 
（1999） noted, the shift to SMDs was of crucial significance because this particular 
electoral system played a central role in “majoritarian democracies.” 
　　Majoritarian democracies in Lijphart’s model are characterized by the concentra-
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tion of power in the central government, and they tend to weaken the independence 
of institutions such as the Central Bank, the judiciary, and local governments. Over 
the course of Japan’s political reforms after the 1990s, however, reformers believed 
the independence of these external institutions had to be strengthened because of the 
shift to majoritarianism. For that reason, decentralization reforms, judiciary reforms, 
and the revision of the Bank of Japan Law reinforced the autonomy of these institu-
tions in tandem with the shift to majoritarianism. The reduction of government inter-
ference in society was also pursued through measures such as private sector 
deregulation and regulatory relaxation. Freedom of choice in education was expanded 
through the abolition of educational districts and the introduction of a public school 
choice system. 
Was the Japanese Experience Exceptional?
Because of the political reforms taking place since the 1990s, the Japanese polity has 
become a hybrid, featuring a concentration of power around the chief executive in the 
central government and a diffusion of powers among decision-making domains such as 
local governments, the judicial branch, and the central bank. Because this is not a typi-
cal mixture if reforms are aimed at establishing a majoritarian polity, one might re-
gard this as something exceptional or unique to Japan.
　　Interestingly, however, a similar kind of combination has been found in the British 
Constitutional Reform since the 1990s. Britain, the mother nation of majoritarian de-
mocracy, has experienced many institutional reforms, including the devolution of 
power to Scotland and Wales, the increased independence of the judicial branch, the 
partial recovery of some power by the upper house （the House of Lords）, and the 
introduction of the PR electoral system to the EU parliament and subnational legisla-
tures. Some argue that these reforms should be seen as “Madisonian”; they certainly 
led to the separation of powers by increasing the number of veto players in deci-
sion-making processes. Current British politics feature a hybrid of the traditional con-
centration of power and the diffusion of powers. Remembering that the Madisonian 
polity is pluralistic, we might regard the new polity as British-style pluralism.
　　British Constitutional Reform was conducted with the recognition that traditional 
majoritarianism worked poorly as socioeconomic diversity increased in British society 
and cooperation with EU became indispensable for British prosperity. Two-party com-
petition and the concentration of power excluded the proper representations of mi-
norities' interests. Because the European Union emphasized minority rights and its 
social diversity was significant, it requested that all the member nations adopt the PR 
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system for European Parliament elections. In sum, its political reforms were motivated 
by the recognition and evaluation of the current situations in Britain. The same was 
true in Japan. In this context, Japanese political reforms were quite typical.
　　What made Japanese political reforms unique was the intellectual starting point I 
argue for in this paper. Japanese-style pluralism described pluralistic decision-making 
processes in which many actors could participate and be satisfied. At the same time, 
however, these processes excluded other actors out of reach of LDP predominance 
and bureaucratic protections, including supporters of opposition parties, civic activists, 
and consumer activists. The most problematic aspect of this system was its lack of 
turnover of political power. Even without referring to Madison’s original view, political 
turnover seems to be a necessary condition of a plural system. In this sense, we 
should say that Japanese-style pluralism had fundamental contradictions.
　　As a result, political reforms were necessary to reduce these contradictions, se-
curing the possibility of turnover in party politics and separating overly interconnect-
ing decision-making domains. These involved combining the centralization of power 
while also eliminating ties between the central government and external domains 
（economic, social, or local institutions）. I label this package of reforms Japanese-style 
majoritarianism. Although Japanese-style majoritarianism is similar to the orthodox 
model of majoritarianism in terms of concentrating power in the central government’s 
hands, Japanese-style majoritarianism is different in that it reduces the links between 
the central government and external institutions.
　　The deeply felt urge to cut through these collusive relationships is understand-
able. However, insufficient intellectual consideration was given to the consequences of 
reducing central government intervention in institutions such as local governments 
and the central bank. The reformers were also not fully aware that they were includ-
ing elements that differed from standard majoritarianism. These two problems, lay-
ered upon each other, have resulted in what can be called “plural immobility.” Plural 
immobility refers to a situation in which multiple actors with decision-making powers 
undertake diverging policy decisions independently, resulting in a loss of policy direc-
tion as a whole. The source of this immobility stems from the links between the cen-
tral government and external institutions and groups being reduced, permitting each 
of these groups to pursue autonomous actions. In conjunction with certain areas that 
were left untouched by reform, a deepening pluralization within the political system 
rendered decision-making difficult. This outcome was not desired, but it could arguably 
have been predicted. 9
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Conclusion
In this paper, I deal with the intellectual origins of Japanese political reforms since the 
1990s. It has often been noted that comprehensive political reforms stemmed from the 
recognition that the Japanese polity did not prepare for the new international environ-
ments existing following the end of the Cold War. The Gulf Crisis and War clearly 
showed weak points in the Japanese system. The reforms should be regarded as re-
sponses to this traumatic experience. In addition, the U.S.-Japan relationship qualita-
tively transformed after the mid-1980s. Until that time, it was a stable partnership 
between a senior entity and a junior one. Because of the American economic down-
turn and the Japanese upturn, the United States came to see Japan as a major com-
petitor and to request structural reforms as a precondition to entering the Japanese 
market. These requests could not be fulfilled using the traditional Japanese deci-
sion-making style.
　　While this paper also emphasizes the latter aspect as a reason for political re-
forms, I argue that what the United States criticized during the economic frictions 
and the Structural Impediments Initiative （SII） talks in the 1980s was a significant 
factor in what LDP predominance depended on. This was called “Japanese-style plu-
ralism” after Nakakita’s prominent work （2014）; it had two main features. First, it 
gave opportunities for equal participation and veto powers to many political actors 
connected with the LDP. Rank-and-file members of the LDP, bureaucrats, and interest 
groups handled bottom-up decision-making processes. Second, it excluded actors who 
did not have a positive relationship with the LDP. Although the LDP’s “insider” policy 
communities allowed relatively frank discussions on policies and gave access to 
younger members, without political turnover for long years, they gradually became 
iron triangles, which maintain a status quo.
　　In this sense, the political reforms during the 1990s can be understood as roll-
backs of the other intellectual wave that evaluated the LDP and postwar Japanese 
politics positively: non-Marxist modernism. Because this wave emphasized the signifi-
cance of committing to liberal democratic values and alliances with the United States 
and other Western nations, the LDP wanted to maintain these commitments. Modern-
ists did not believe, however, in LDP predominance and its distinctions between “in-
siders” and “outsiders” in decision-making processes. Instead, if these distinctions 
prevented Japan from employing the necessary policies to continue its commitments, 
9 　For more detailed information on the results of political reforms, please see Machidori 
（2015）. This section is partially extracted from that article.
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LDP predominance and its decision-making processes should have been dismantled. 
For this reason, non-Marxist modernists advocated and initiated comprehensive politi-
cal reforms intellectually despite their long-lasting support of the LDP government.
　　Modernists certainly had a clear understanding of the problems Japan faced and 
of the direction in which Japan should go. However, their prescriptions led to other 
kinds of problems in decision-making processes. Because they strongly believed that 
interconnections among insiders mattered, it was necessary for them to dismantle 
these interconnections by separating the decision-making domains and abandoning in-
sider-only pluralities. As a result, each decision-making domain became autonomous 
and made decisions without considering the effects on other domains. Newly autono-
mous domains do not necessarily accept decisions from other domains. Such situations 
led to a pluralistic immobility of the Japanese polity, which is currently the largest 
challenge to Japanese government.
